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Abstract: The paper analyzes the discussions present in the Italian press, 
following Romania’s solidarity with the Czechoslovak cause, in the context created 
by the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact members, as a reaction to the 
Prague Spring. Nicolae Ceauescu’s gesture signified the peak of his popularity 
abroad, being bypassed only by the Yugoslav leader, Josip Broz Tito. Still, 
different opinions with regard to this stance can be found in the 1968 press. While 
some saw in Ceauescu an example of communist reformer, others believed that 
Romania’s support was also a political affair and an opportunistic gesture. These 
type of discussions can be found in L’Unità, Avanti!, Il Popolo, La Stampa and 
Corriere della Sera, the five Italian newspapers studied by this paper.  
Keywords: Ceauescu, Romania, Italian press, Czechoslovakia, Warsaw Pact, 
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Introduction  
 One of the most bizarre military actions in history was the crushing of the 
Prague Spring in August 1968. It was the only military operation carried out by the 
Warsaw Pact, military alliance of the communist countries from Europe (excepting 
Yugoslavia and Albania from 1968), and, ironically, it was directed against one of 
its members, the Czechoslovak Republic. Romania was the only member of the 
Warsaw Pact that did not take part in the invasion, and, moreover, it supported 
Dubek’s Czechoslovakia, a fact illustrated by Nicolae Ceauescu’s speech from 
21 August 1968, in which he declared that “The penetration of the troops of the 
five socialist countries in Czechoslovakia constitutes a big mistake and a grave 
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danger for the defense of peace in Europe, for the fate of socialism in the world”1. 
Interestingly, Ion Gheorghe Maurer, at that time prime minister of Romania, said, 
after the fall of communism, that Ceauescu did not discuss with him about the 
speech and that the Romanian general secretary’s action was “an invitation to 
invasion because about resistance, with odds, it could not have been possible to 
think”2.   
The Romanian dictator’s support for Czechoslovakia was not necessarily a 
surprise since he already continued the opening of the regime initiated by his 
predecessor, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and sought to gain a larger independence 
from Moscow and thus improve relations with the West. Romania became the first 
country from the Eastern Bloc which established, in 1967, diplomatic relations 
with the Federal Republic of Germany. Regarding the Six-Day War, against the 
position of the Warsaw Pact states, Romania supported Israel and did not break 
diplomatic relations with this state. In these conditions, it is not surprising that 
Ceauescu exploited at maximum the context created by the Czechoslovak issue. 
But, as Maurer, his own prime minister, pointed out, “Ceauescu didn’t want to 
create a more liberal regime, he could not agree with what the Czechoslovaks had 
done, on the contrary, limited, by each day, the liberties from within the country. If 
he had something against the interference of the Russians in the internal affairs of 
the country, it was precisely to avoid his accounts getting spoiled”3. 
 Although the attitude of Western politics, media and population was 
primarily hostile towards the invasion of Prague, among the reactions of the West 
to Ceauescu’s position different tones can be observed. Despite the fact that most 
of them supported entirely Ceauescu’s position, opinions suggesting that the 
discourses of the Romanian dictator were proof of opportunism did exist. An 
approach to these reactions is very useful because Romania’s position could have 
been a crucial moment in the Cold War, since, according to secret British 
documents, Britain was decided to lunch military actions in the Balkans, if the 
                                                
1 “Cuvântul tovarului Nicolae Ceauescu la adunarea populaiei din capital în Piaa Palatului 
Republicii”, in Principiile de baz ale politicii externe a României, Bucharest, Editura Politic, 
1968, p. 11. 
2 Lavinia Betea, Maurer i lumea de ieri, Cluj-Napoca, Editura Dacia, 2001, p. 186. 
3
Ibidem, pp. 186-187. 
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USSR would have tried to punish Romania and Yugoslavia for their attitude4. 
Eventually, Romania was not invaded by Soviet troops and Ceauescu managed, 
for the moment, to gain the support he was looking for.  
Italy in the 1960s: politics and print media 
An interesting case is Italy, where the communists had one of the strongest 
political parties from noncommunist Europe and enjoyed quite a large support 
from a part of the Italian population. Although the Italian communists dominated 
the regions Emilia-Romagna, Umbria and Tuscany, they never managed to form a 
government. This privilege belonged from 1946 to 1994 to the Christian 
Democrats (DC), a catholic catch-all party, with a centrist orientation.  Starting 
with 1963, the DC governed Italy along with the Italian Socialist Party (PSI), thus 
switching the position of the governing coalition from a centrist stance to a centre-
left position. This type of coalition would last until 1976, when The Historical 
Compromise between the DC and the Italian Communist Party (PCI) took place, 
suggesting the external support offered by the communists to the Christian 
democrats. It is important to note that from 1966 to 1971, the PSI formed a united 
party with the Italian Democratic Socialist Party (PSDI), named the Unified 
Socialist Party (PSU). 
A feature of Italian politics was and still is the centrist and leftist tradition, 
the liberal parties enjoying little support. For example, in the 1968 general 
elections, the Italian Liberal Party (PLI) managed to obtain only 5.82 % of the 
votes for the Chamber of Deputies5 and 6.79 % for the Senate6. The invasion of 
Czechoslovakia was, as expected, condemned by the democratic parties and also 
by the communist party, but as we will see, the Czechoslovak issue was translated 
into the political sphere. The most interesting discussions were related to the PCI, 
which reached a very low point in terms of relations with Moscow and the other 
communist countries that invaded Czechoslovakia.  
                                                
4 Martin Bright, “Revealed: Britain on brink of war with Soviet Union in 1968”, The Guardian, 9 
January 2000, http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2000/jan/09/freedomofinformation.uk 
(accessed on 30 November 2014). 
5 See election results for the Chamber of Deputies, 19/05/1968, Ministero dell'Interno. Archivio 
storico delle elezioni. Camera, (http://elezionistorico.interno.it). 
6 See election results for the Senat, 19/05/1968, Ministero dell'Interno. Archivio storico delle 
elezioni. Senato, (http://elezionistorico.interno.it).  
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A good index for the study of the perception of Ceauescu’s position from 
1968 is the Italian press. Newspapers such as L’Unità, La Stampa, Corriere della 
Sera, Il Popolo or Avanti! can offer an image of how Romanian’s decision to 
condemn the intervention of the Warsaw Pact in Czechoslovakia was perceived 
and understood. The political discourse is obviously reproduced partly in the 
media, referring here to the part of it that was controlled by political parties. Il 
Popolo was the official newspaper of the main government party, the DC, L’Unità
was the voice of the Italian communists and Avanti! belonged to the socialists. 
These newspapers were the voices of the political parties they represented, their 
visions being subordinated to those of their parties. 
Besides the party newspapers, one cannot overlook the importance of the 
historical newspapers in Italy. Thus, a more equidistant position is given by 
Corriere della Sera, owned at that time by the Crespi family, which possessed a 
strong textile industry. The newspaper played and still plays a big role in the 
Italian media with a centrist stance. However, this would change after president 
Saragat’s mandate expired and Spadolini, the editor of the journal, lost the most 
influential sponsor he had, the ownership changing the helmsman in March 1972 
and choosing Piero Ottone7. The later would move the journal’s position to the left. 
Regarding La Stampa, the newspaper was owned at the time and still is by the 
wealthy Agnelli family, which also owns the automobile company Fiat. According 
to Vitorio Zucconi, Giulio De Benedetti, director of the journal from 1948 to 1968, 
was responsible for making the journal the only one in which the intelligentsia that 
was not clerical, but reformist and liberal could be recognized8. The average 
circulation of the two historical newspapers in 1966 was 522.365 copies for 
Corriere della Sera and 421.316 for La Stampa9. As a comparison, in 1975, the 
average daily sale for Corriere della Sera was 500.500 copies and only 361.100 
for La Stampa10. The number of daily sales decreased for both journals, but the 
distance between the two increased.  
                                                
7 Giuseppe Farinelli et al., Storia del giornalismo italiano: dalle origini a oggi, Torino, Utet 
Libreria, nuova edizione, 2004, p. 344. 
8 Vitorio Zucconi, Parola di giornalista, online edition, http://www.repubblica.it/online/parola_di_ 
giornalista/setttimo/setttimo/setttimo.html (accessed on 30 November 2014).  
9 Paolo Murialdi, Storia del giornalismo italiano, Bologna, Società editrice il Mulino, nuova 
edizione, 2006, p. 232. 
10
Ibidem, p. 243. 
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Although none of these newspapers criticized directly Ceauescu, different 
tones among the journals can be observed when studying the articles that deal with 
the Czechoslovak issue. While the political newspapers are useful for the study of 
the perception of the main Italian political parties on the event from 
Czechoslovakia, the newspapers Corriere della Sera and La Stampa offer more 
independent stances regarding the invasion and Romania’s solidarity with 
Czechoslovakia. 
Reactions in the Italian press  
 Obviously, one of the most interesting study cases is L’Unità, the official 
newspaper of the Italian Communist Party (PCI). First, the stance of the PCI and 
thus of L’Unità, was pro-Czechoslovak and critical towards the invasion. The 
position of the PCI is useful to study since, although the Western communists were 
generally critical towards the invasion, pro-Soviet stances did exist, for example 
the Communist Party of Austria’s newspaper, Volksstimme, tried to justify the 
military intervention11. The stance of the PCI is clearly stated on the first page of 
the official journal from 22 August. In this sense, it is underlined that “The 
Political Bureau of the PCI expresses its serious disapproval”12. An approval of the 
invasion could have meant a decline in the next elections, while a condemnation of 
the aggression on Czechoslovakia could present the independent position of the 
PCI in front of the Italian electorate. 
Moreover, the Italian communist Giancarlo Pajetta, who was also the 
director of L’Unità, went to Bucharest to meet Ceauescu13. An article dedicated to 
a meeting between the party leaders suggested that “On this occasion, in a warm 
atmosphere, fraternal, were discussed issues related to the continuous development 
of the relations of the fraternal friendship between the Romanian Communist Party 
and the PCI, as well as current problems of the communist and workers’ movement 
                                                
11 Kevin Devlin, “Western CPs Condemn Invasion, Hail Prague Spring”, Radio Free Europe, 22 
August 1978, p. 4, http://osaarchivum.org/files/holdings/300/8/3/pdf/22-4-11.pdf (accessed on 30 
November 2014). 
12 “L’Ufficio Politico del PCI esprime il suo grave dissenso”. “Ore Drammatiche a Praga”, L’Unità, 
22 August 1968, p. 1. 
13 Sergio Mugnai, “Colloquio a Bucarest di G.C. Pajetta con Ceausescu”, L’Unità, 8 September 
1968, p. 1 (hereinafter Mugnai, “Colloquio a Bucarest…”);  Sergio Mugnai, “G.C. Pajetta e 
Niculescu-Mizil parlano agli operai di Bucarest”, L’Unità, 10 September 1968, p. 1. 
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and of the international situation which concerns the two parties”14. The Italian 
communists were taking a different path than the one followed by Moscow, and 
thus the Romanian Communist Party (PCR) was seen as an important ally, as an 
example that has to be shown to the Italian electorate.  
 One of the main titles discussing the Czechoslovak issue quotes the 
Romanian general secretary: “Ceauescu: full solidarity with the Czechoslovak 
people”15, and presents a large description of the speech given by Ceauescu on 21 
August. In the same newspaper, an article entitled “Ceauescu exalts the socialist 
society source of freedom”, underlines that “In several speeches the Romanian 
leader puts in the center of the problem of unity of the socialist countries, the 
respect of alliances, the internal autonomy and the development of democracy”16. 
By portraying Ceauescu as a good communist who supports the brotherhood of 
socialist states and their own way to socialism, the Italian communists suggest 
their own opinion about the crushing of the Prague Spring and therefore their will 
to follow a direction that is not imposed by Moscow. It is also an attempt to prove 
to the public that communism is not the property of Moscow and that an alternative 
socialist society to the one promoted by the Soviet policy can be found.  
 It is also useful to see the discourse present in La Stampa with regard to 
Ceauescu’s position. La Stampa is a newspaper owned, as mentioned earlier, by 
the owners of Fiat, the Agnelli family, and has a liberal stance. The newspaper was 
also critical towards the Warsaw Pact aggression. As part of Romania’s support for 
Czechoslovakia, the situation of the Czechoslovak tourists present in Romania at 
the moment of the invasion is described in the following way: “Solidarity with 
Prague is expressed in a clamorous mode at Hungary’s border, where hundreds of 
Czechoslovaks who were here on vacation tried yesterday to pass through to return 
home. The Hungarian police had sent on the first groups in a kind of concentration 
camp at a short distance from the border; because of this, the others (there are 
several hundred) have decided to stay in Romania. The government has given 
                                                
14 “In tale occasione, in una atmosfera calda, fraterna, sono stati discussi problemi relativi ai 
continuo sviluppo delle relazioni di fraterna amicizia fra il Partito comunista romeno e il PCI così 
come problemi attuali del movimento comunista e operaio e della situazione internazionale i quali 
interessano i due partiti”. Sergio Mugnai, “Colloquio a Bucarest...”. 
15 Sergio Mugnai, “Ceausescu: piena solidarietà con il popolo cecoslovacco”, L’Unità, 22 August 
1968, p. 3. 
16 “In diversi discorsi il leader romeno mette al centro il problema dell’unità dei paesi socialisti, il 
rispetto delle alleanze, l’autonomia interna e lo sviluppo della democrazia”. Sergio Mugnai, 
“Ceausescu esalta la società socialista fonte di libertà”, L’Unità, 28 August 1968, p. 2. 
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disposition to welcome and host for free. But meanwhile people from nearby 
villages had gathered around the cars of the Czechoslovak tourists, bringing 
sandwiches, fruits, cigarettes and offering to host them in their homes”17. It can be 
easily observed the antithesis present in these affirmations about the Czechoslovak 
tourists. The Romanian government and even the Romanian population protecting 
the Czechoslovaks, compared to the more radical stance of Hungary, one of the 
invaders of Czechoslovakia, which was hostile towards the Czechoslovak tourists 
present on its territory. Moreover, considering the fact that the writer of the article, 
Sandro Viola, was reporting from Bucharest, most likely he found out about the 
Hungarian concentration camps from the Romanian side. The information is 
probably an exaggeration of the situation from Hungary. 
Presenting the discourse of the Romanian general secretary from 30 August 
1968, the following opinion is stated: “But it is the central passage of the discourse 
worthwhile reporting completely because it is possible that one day or another will 
be inserted in the most important documents of the process of «de-satellization» of 
the communist countries of Eastern Europe”18. This is a clear expression of the 
positive way in which Ceauescu’s position from 1968 was seen by a part of the 
Western media, his brave affirmation being considered historical and thus an 
important step towards the independence of the socialist states from Moscow. It is 
also an illustration of the hostility, directed against the Soviet Union, of La 
Stampa. Surprisingly, the threat of invasion is described in a very positive way: 
“The government in Bucharest has avoided the worst with a policy of elastic 
resistance: an act of courage and a retreat, great care not to irritate Moscow, print 
                                                
17 “La solidarietà con Praga si è espressa in modo clamoroso alla frontiera dell’Ungheria, da dove 
centinaia di cecoslovacchi che erano qui in vancaza, cercavano ieri di passare per rientrare in patria. 
La polizia ungherese aveva inoltrato i primi gruppi in una specie di campo di concentramento poco 
distante dalla frontiera, cui gli altri (sono varie centinaia) hanno deciso di restare in Romania. il 
governo ha dato disposizione per accoglierli e ospitarli gratuitamente. Ma intanto la gente dei 
villaggi vicini era accorsa intorno alle automobili dei turisti cecoslovacchi portando panini, frutta, 
sigarette e offrendosi di ospitarli nelle loro case”. Sandro Viola, “A Bucarest si dànno armi alla 
«guardia civile»”, La Stampa, 23 August 1968, p. 4.  
18 “Ma è il passo centrale del discorso che vale la pena di riportare per intero, perche è probabile 
che un giorno o l'altro dovrà essere inserito nei documenti più importanti del processo di 
«desatellizzazione» dei Paesi comunisti dell'Est europeo”. Sandro Viola, “Nuovo coraggioso 
discorso di Ceausescu”, La Stampa, 2-3 September 1968, p. 3. 
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control”19. Although these affirmations miss the goal and the characteristics of 
Ceauescu’s foreign policy, they do illustrate how the Romanian dictator managed 
to keep his prestige and not become too irritant for the Soviets. Also, it is 
interesting that a liberal journal is mentioning the print control as one way of 
avoiding an invasion. Besides this, with or without the threat of invasion, the 
censorship would have existed anyway.  
A more critical approach towards Ceauescu’s attitude is given by Corriere 
della Sera, an Italian newspaper which had at that time a centrist stance. 
Discussing the switch of tone present in the speeches of Ceauescu, comes into 
notice the idea that “If the conclusions of what happened should be drawn today 
and nothing would change later, we should say that Ceauescu comes out virtually 
as winner from the great competition”20. History proves us how correct this 
affirmation was since Ceauescu didn’t face a Soviet invasion of Romania and his 
popularity grew rapidly. With regard to the independent line promoted by the 
Romanian general secretary and which reached its highest point in 1968, the 
discourse present in Corriere della Sera, seems to be less optimistic, and thus it is 
stated that “Whoever will be the future leaders of the Kremlin and regardless of the 
predominant opinions, it is certain that Bucharest will have to sooner or later 
reckon with Moscow”21. In other words, it is suggested that the independence of 
Romania has its limits and that a disintegration of the Communist Bloc is unlikely.  
The newspaper goes even further, pointing out that “The Romanian 
Communist Party leadership is clearly committed to a policy of formal détente but 
substantial rigidity. This attitude of compromise dictated by the experience of 
Czechoslovakia, becomes a model and a pretext for the future policy. It is no 
exception, in fact, to anyone that the Romanians seize at least for the moment, the 
positive fruits of the Czechoslovak misadventure”22. These are arguments that 
                                                
19 “Il governo di Bucarest ha evitato il peggio con una politica di resistenza elastica: un atto di 
coraggio e un ripiegamento, grande cura nel non irritare Mosca, controllo della stampa”. Sandro 
Viola, “I romeni non sono tranquilli”, La Stampa, 7 September 1968, p. 3. 
20 “Se le conclusioni di quanto è accaduto dovessero essere tratte oggi e nulla dovesse cambiare in 
seguito, si dovrebbe dire che Ceausescu esce virtualmente vincitore dal grande confronto”. Alfredo 
Pieroni, “Sollievo in Romania”, Corriere della Sera, 28 August 1968,  p. 4. 
21 “Quali che siano i futuri dirigenti del Cremlino e quali che siano le opinioni prevalenti, è certo 
che Bucarest dovrà prima o poi fare i conti con Mosca”. Ibidem. 
22 “La direzione del partito comunista romeno è chiaramente impegnata ad una politica di 
distensione formale, ma di rigidità sostanziale. È l’atteggiamento dettato dalla esperienza 
cecoslovaca, che diventa un modello e un pretesto per la politica futura. Non sfugge, infatti, a 
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present the attitude of the Romanian state towards the crushing of the Prague 
Spring as a sign of opportunism since Romania benefited from the Czechoslovak 
issue, rigidity and formality characterizing the stance of the PCR. Indeed, although 
Ceauescu was officially open to reform and very vocal on the international arena, 
internally he did not change much and later even radicalized his regime. In other 
words, Corriere della Sera did not rush to praise Romania for its attitude towards 
the invasion, but rather tried to present a different face of the issue. 
As the main voice of the PSU, the newspaper Avanti! presents a useful 
study case that illustrates the official position of the Italian socialists with regard to 
the Warsaw Pact invasion. The PSU was at that time part of the government 
coalition. As expected, the Italian socialists denounced the aggression against 
Czechoslovakia. A frequent discussion in Avanti! is the one concerning a possible 
invasion of Romania by the USSR. In this sense, it is pointed out that “Romania 
would have refused the request of Soviet conduct in its territory, joint military 
maneuvers of the Warsaw Pact. As it is known this rumor was accredited by 
various sources, but all unofficial. The spokesman of the Romanian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, yesterday, declared that he knew nothing of such a request from 
the Soviet side. But, he underlines, had neither confirmed nor denied the 
speculations in this regard. Also about the refusal we have many rumors but they 
are absolutely not official. It is understandable the caution on the Romanian part. 
Also with Czechoslovakia, the action began with a request for joint maneuvers, 
and then came the occupation”23. This stance in considerably different from the 
one present in Corriere della Sera, suggesting the solidarity of the Italian socialists 
with the Romanian state which many considered to be, along with Yugoslavia, 
                                                                                                                                      
nessuno che i romeni colgono almeno per il momento, i frutti positivi della disavventura 
cecoslovacca”. Alfredo Pieroni, “Bucarest sollecita il ritiro dei russi dalla Cecoslovacchia”, 
Corriere della Sera, 30 August 1968,  p. 5. 
23 “La Romania avrebbe opposto un rifiuto alla richiesta sovietica di svolgere, nel suo territorio, 
manovre militari congiunte del patto di Varsovia. Come è noto questa voce è stata accreditata da 
diverse fonti, ma tutte non ufficiali. Il portavoce romeno del ministro degli Esteri, ieri, aveva 
dichiarato  di non sapere nulla di una richiesta del genere da parte sovietica. Ma, si sottolinea, non 
aveva nè confermato nè smentito le illazioni in proposito. Anche per il rifiuto si naviga nelle 
indiscrezioni assolutamente non ufficiali. È comprensibile la cautela da parte romena. Anche con la 
Cecoslovacchia le cosa iniziarono con la richiesta di manovre congiunte, e poi avvenne 
l'occupazione”. “Bucarest avrebbe rifiutato le manovre sul suo territorio”, Avanti!, 30 August 1968, 
p. 2. 
1.3*E	<=	

32 
Moscow’s next target. Romania’s caution is attributed to the threat of Soviet 
intervention and not to opportunism as Corriere della Sera suggests.   
The description of Ceauescu’s caution and even his will to reconcile with 
Moscow goes even further. Regarding the position of Romania and Yugoslavia at 
the beginning of September, the journal states the following: „Ceauescu willing to 
broad economic concessions and completely get back in the orbit of Moscow: 
however, stipulates as a condition the independence of the government from 
Prague – there are still high tensions in Yugoslavia, anyway it was declared that 
they are ready to face the worst without retreat”24. First, it is important to note that 
Yugoslavia maintained its firm position because it did not border the USSR as 
Romania did and thus it was less exposed, and also because it was a communist 
country that even Stalin realized it was lost after the Soviet-Yugoslav split from 
1948. But it is important to note the underlining of Ceauescu’s willingness to 
sacrifice his country for Czechoslovakia. The way in which Romania’s desire to 
reconcile with Moscow is presented can also be described as a paradox. This is 
because, in the way the socialists portrayed the situation, Ceauescu is basically 
giving away his country’s independence in order to save Czechoslovakia’s 
independence, which is an obvious exaggeration.  
Il Popolo is another important newspaper that needs to be analyzed since it 
was the voice of the Christian democrats, who formed the major government party. 
With regard to Romania, an article suggested that “Voices clearly contrary to those 
that come from countries «aligned» to the positions of the states of the «Warsaw 
Pact» are from Romanian newspapers. Which, this morning, dedicate their front 
pages to the press release issued at the conclusion of the joint meeting of the 
Central Committee of the Romanian CP, the State Council and the government in 
Bucharest”25. This is a clear distinction made by the newspaper between the 
invaders of Czechoslovakia and friendly Romania, using as an argument the 
newspapers from these countries. 
                                                
24 “Ceausescu disposto ad ampie concessioni economiche e a rientrare pienamente nell'orbita di 
Mosca: tuttavia pone come condizione l'indipendenza per il governo di Praga - Tensione sempre più 
viva in Jugoslavia dove però si dichiara di essere pronti ad affrontare il peggio senza 
indietreggiare”. “Drammatica situazione anche per la Romania”, Avanti!, 1 September 1968, p. 1. 
25 “Voci nettamente contrarie a quelle che provengono dai paesi «allineati» sulle posizioni degli 
stati dei Patto di Varsovia vengono dai quotidiani romeni. I quali, stamane, dedicano le loro prime 
pagine al comunicato emesso al termine della riunione congiunta del comitato centrale del PC 
romeno, del consiglio di stato e del governo di Bucarest”. “La Romania mobilita l’esercito per 
fronteggiare ogni evenienza”, Il Popolo, 23 August 1968, p. 3. 
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 Moreover, it is stated that “Completing the front pages of the newspapers 
of the capital and the provinces, wide reportages on the popular demonstrations 
held in front of the palace of the republic (we calculated a presence of 100.000 
people) during which the citizens of Bucharest expressed their unconditional trust 
in the policy of the government and the Romanian communist party. All the 
newspapers also report letters sent to their respective newsrooms, in which citizens 
of the various social strata express their feelings about the  «responsibility of the 
Romanian people towards the destinies of the country, the cause of socialism and 
peace» and on the «full approval on the behavior of the Government on the 
Czechoslovak issue»”26. The support of the Christian democrats for Ceauescu and 
his foreign policy is obvious here, but it is surprising the description of the 
Romanian public opinion, which underlines the legitimacy of a communist regime, 
supported by a population that had the same view on the Warsaw Pact invasion as 
its leaders. 
While Ceauescu was portrayed by the DC newspaper as an example and 
his gesture was entirely supported, Il Popolo and the Christian democrats seemed 
to have a totally different opinion on the position of the Italian communists. In this 
sense, Arlando Forlani, vice secretary of the DC, is quoted saying “That the group 
of PCI has felt the need not to defend the armed intervention of the Soviet Union, 
answer rather in terms of solidarity for the government and the Czechoslovak 
people is a fact based that has a target value independent of the motives that 
remain weak and contradictory”27. The attack on the PCI can be explained by the 
growing fear among the Christian Democrats that the split between the Italian 
communists and Moscow could legitimize the PCI in front of the population and 
thus become an even bigger threat in the next elections. However, despite these 
                                                
26 “Completano le prime pagine del quotidiani della capitale e delle provincie, ampi servizi sulla 
manifestazione popolare svoltasi di fronte al palazzo della republica (si è calcolata una presenza di 
100 mila persone), nel corso della quale i cittadini di Bucarest hanno espresso la loro fiducia 
incondizionata alla politica del governo e del partito comunista Romeno. Tutti i giornali, inoltre, 
riportano lettere inviate alle rispettive redazioni, nelle quali cittadini dei più vari strati sociali 
esprimono i propri sentimenti sulla «piena responsabilità del popolo Romeno nei confronti dei 
destini della patria, della causa del socialismo e della pace», e sulla «piena approvazione sul 
comportamento del governo romeno in merito alla questione cecoslovacca»”. Ibidem. 
27 “Che il gruppo del PCI abbia sentito la necessità di non difendere l'intervento armato dell'Unione 
Sovietica, pronunciandosi anzi in termini di solidarietà per il governo ed il popolo cecoslovacco è 
un fatto base che ha un valore obiettivo indipendentemente dalle motivazioni che restano deboli e 
contraddittorie”. Mario Angius, “Il PCI non ha fatto la scelta di fondo”, Il Popolo, 1 September 
1968, p. 1. 
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accusations aimed at the Italian communists, the journal states in the same day 
about the Romanian general secretary that “Despite the need to find with the 
Soviets a solution that avoids the same fate for Romania that has befallen the 
Czechoslovaks, president Ceauescu continues to maintain in his speeches an 
exemplary dignity and pride”28. Overlooking the unconsciousness of Ceauescu’s 
discourses, the journal regards his attitude as an example due to the high Soviet 
pressure that was on Romania at the moment. 
 Following the accusations from Il Popolo, the PCI, through L’Unità, 
responded with an attack on the DC, saying that “We still see before our eyes 
Moro who refuses to explain why, for years, has expressed no disagreement but 
«understanding» (namely complicity) for the military intervention and bloody 
American bombing in Vietnam”29. The parallel with the crushing of the Prague 
Spring is obvious, suggesting the different way in which the Christian Democrats 
deal with foreign military interventions. The same article concludes that “«Il 
Popolo» should resign itself. It’s up to it, not to us, to show «more courage» to 
make «a step forward»”30. This is how international affairs were translated into the 
Italian political sphere, both DC and PCI accusing each other, using their own 
media, of lake of attitude or even complicity with an invading state.  
The Christian democrats feared that the already powerful PCI could gain 
even more support after its break with Moscow, and, on the other side, the Italian 
communists used the DC discourse on the invasion of Czechoslovakia against 
them, underlining the different tone used in the context of the Vietnam War. The 
situation was even more complicated for the Christian democrats since the 
socialists, the government partners, seemed to support the PCI. For example, 
following the critics from Poland on the Italian communists, Avanti! wrote that 
“The organ of the party, then, published yesterday a long attack to the Italian CP, 
                                                
28 “Nonostante la necessità di dover trovare con i sovietici una soluzione che eviti alla Romania la 
stessa sorte che è toccata al cecoslovacchi, il presidente Ceausescu continua a mentenere nel suoi 
discorsi una esemplare dignità e fierezza”. “Sotto la minaccia dell’aggressione Bucarest sta cedendo 
al ricatto”, Il Popolo, 1 September 1968, p. 3. 
29 “Abbiamo ancora davanti agli occhi il Moro che si rifiuta di spiegare perchè, per anni, abbia 
espresso non dissenso ma  «comprensione» (cioè complicità) per l'intervento militare e i sanguinari 
bombardamenti americani nel Vietnam”. Maurizio Ferrara, “Il dissenso del «Popolo»”, L’Unità, 8 
September 1968, p. 1. Aldo Moro was until June 1968 the Christian democrat prime minister of 
Italy. 
30 “Il Popolo si rassegni. Tocca a lui non a noi, dimostrare «più coraggio» fare «un passo in 
avanti»”. Ibidem. 
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unable to betray the embarrassment of a polemic with a party that until a few 
weeks ago had been presented as a model, sometimes even in opposition to the 
Soviets themselves”31. Despite the attack of the Christian democrats on the PCI, 
the PSU shows solidarity with the Italian communists. 
Conclusions 
As we have seen, Ceauescu’s gesture not only legitimized his regime in 
front of the Romanian citizens, but it also managed to portray the Romanian 
dictator, in front of the Western public, as a reformist and a modern type of 
communist leader. Although his position could have cost him the independence of 
his country, Ceauescu seemed to have made a wise decision not to support 
Moscow’s actions and instead speak for the independence of the Czechoslovak 
people. Moreover, by changing the tone of his discourses, he probably prevented 
an invasion of Romania.  
 In the case of Italy, after analyzing the discourses present in the main 
newspapers, we can conclude that the Romanian dictator’s popularity reached a 
pick, Ceauescu being regarded as a new type of communist; one completely 
independent from Moscow, and his country was seen as an example of a modern 
socialist state. L’Unità, as the official journal of the PCI, praised Ceauecu for not 
invading Czechoslovakia and for his solidarity with the Czechoslovaks, since this 
was in accordance with the stance of the Italian communists, who, after the split 
with Moscow, needed a new communist ally and an example for the Italian 
electorate. The liberal newspaper La Stampa has also seen in Ceauescu the image 
of a new type of communist, presenting his country, Romania, in opposition to the 
more radical states of Eastern Europe, the Warsaw Pact members that crushed the 
Prague Spring. 
 As in the case of L’Unità, the journals Avanti! and Il Popolo mirrored the 
position of the political parties they represented. Avanti!, since it was the 
newspaper of the Italian socialists, shows solidarity with Romania, which was 
facing a possible Soviet invasion, even praising it for a supposed willingness to 
                                                
31 “L’organo del partito, poi, ha pubblicato ieri un lungo attacco al PC Italiano, non riuscendo a 
tradire l’imbarazzo di una polemica con un partito che fino a poche settimane fa era stato presentato 
come un modello, alle volte anche in polemica con gli stessi sovietici”. “Varsovia fedelissima di 
Mosca attacca i comunisti italiani”, Avanti!, 10 September 1968, p. 2.  
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give away its own independence for the freedom of Czechoslovakia. In Il Popolo
on the other hand, while presenting the legitimacy of the PCR, it is easy to spot 
connections between the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the Italian politics. Thus, 
the support of the PCI for the independent line promoted by Dubek is perceived 
with skepticism and mistrust. Among the most important newspapers of Italy, the 
most critical journal towards Ceauescu’s discourses about independence and non-
interference in the affairs of other socialist states is Corriere della Sera. The 
newspaper avoids praising the Romanian dictator for his actions and is rather 
suggesting that opportunism is what pushed Romania to a pro-Czechoslovak 
stance. 
 All these being said, we can conclude that, broadly, Ceauescu managed to 
induce among the Italian press that he is a reformist communist and supporter of 
independence of the socialist states in relation to the USSR. Even the skeptical 
articles that appeared in relation to his position had a cautious tone. Ceauescu’s 
speeches paid off, despite the high risk he exposed his country at. Although it 
would not be long until the Romanian dictator would show the real face of his 
regime, which, especially after the seizure of power in the USSR by Gorbachev 
would start to collapse in the eyes of the West, Ceauescu managed to give 
Romania an international prestige that was bypassed only by Tito’s Yugoslavia. 
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